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FEDERAL AID HIGHWAY ROUTING
PROCEDURES:
A VOICE FOR ALL PARTIES
Michael F. Williams*
I. Introduction
One of the most difficult problems coincident with the massive
United States network of federal-aid highways,1 the largest single
public works project in history, 2 is route determination. The loca-
tion of major metropolitan areas and the exigencies of national
defense have largely pre-determined the general corridors for
main highway networks.3 Determination of specific route loca-
tions has been entrusted to the state administrative bodies respon-
sible for route selections within their respective states, usually the
state highway department.4 These state agencies have been
coordinated nationally by the Federal Bureau of Public Roads.
5
*Mr. Williams is a member of the Editorial Board of Prospectus.
I The term includes federal-aid primary, secondary and Interstate highways. 23 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 103 (1964).
2 In the Interstate System alone, more than 29,638 miles of a contemplated total of more
than 41,000 miles of roadways are now open to traffic. Construction is currently
underway on 4,782 miles. Engineering studies and right-of-way acquisition are in
progress on additional mileage. FHA Q. Rep (Dec. 31, 1969).
3 "[The Interstate System] shall be so located as to connect by routes, as direct as
practicable, the principal metropolitan areas, cities, and industrial centers, to serve
the national defense ...." 23 U.S.C. § 103 (d) (1964).
4 23 U.S.C. § 103 (b), (c), (d) (1964). In most states, this will be the state highway
department, although in various states the body entrusted with the power may bear a
different name. For example, in New York the Department of Transportation is
statutorily empowered to choose highway routings. N.Y. TRANsp. LAW § 5
(McKINNEY 1969) (transferring functions of Bureau of Public Works to Department
of Transportation).
5 The Bureau of Public Roads was originally a part of the Department of Commerce. Upon
creation of the Department of Transportation in 1967, the duties of the Bureau were
transferred to it when the new Department subsumed the Federal Highway Ad-
minstrator and the Bureau of Public Roads. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1652 (a), (0(4), 1655
(Supp. 1968).
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While the procedures followed by these highway departmentsin routing federally-aided highvalys vary somewhat fr, m state to
state, certain features are common to most of them.6 After an
initial finding that there is need for increased highway service
between two points, the state highway department begins route
feasibility studies within a broad corridor. Preliminary engineer-
ing and cost-analysis studies pare the many potential routes with-
in the corridor to a more readily manageable number, retaining,
however, a great deal of flexibility. As information is assimilated,
it is formulated into tentatively preferred routes which are then
presented at a public hearing. 7 The function of this public hearing,
as it has evolved, is largely informative; the state highway depart-
ment informs the public of its considered proposals and fields any
inquiries directed to it by hearing participants. A transcript of the
hearing is made to preserve the suggestions of interested persons
for later consideration by the department.8 Bureau approval of a
location and authorization to proceed with right-of-way acquisi-
tion and construction are obtained upon evaluation of the hear-
ing-gathered information, in conjunction with the other data made
available. 9 Right-of-way acquisition, through purchase or con-
demnation, then begins along the approved route. 10 Final engi-
neering studies are then completed with subsequent requests for
competitive bids on the project.11 Actual construction follows.
6 This description of the routing procedure is necessarily brief. For a detailed discussion of
routing procedure, see Note, Pressures in the Process of Administrative Decision: A
Study of Highway Location, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 534 (1960) [cited hereinafter as
Pressures].
Not infrequently this basic procedure has been only the theoretical and not the
actual procedure followed. In such instances, it seems that statutes calling for a
consideration of alternative routes and a broad range of relevant factors have been
sacrificed to economic and political expendiency.7An opportunity for a public hearing is mandatory for federal-aid highway projects. 23
U.S.C. § 128 (1964).
The term "tentatively preferred route" is misleading. Highway planners tend to
adamantly defend, rather than profitably discuss, their initial suggestions after presen-
tation at the public hearing.
823 U.S.C. § 128 (b) (1964).
9 23 U.S.C. §§. 103 (e), 106 (a) (1964).
'OPressures, supra, note 6 at 575. The advance acquisition or rights-of-way is allowed
under certain circumstances. 23 U.S.C. § 108 (1958),as amended, 23 U.S.C.A. § 108
(Supp. 1968).
" Pressures, supra, note 6 at 575.
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Misunderstandings between a state highway department and
individuals or concerned groups may often arise during this rout-
ing process. 12 When the department and concerned individuals
reach a serious impasse on route selection, resolution within the
administrative framework is sometimes impossible.' 3 The court is
then the only forum to which these opponents of the adminis-
trative will can turn for relief.14 The number of highway miles
built annually, the great size of each individual project, and the
decisions to route new highways through heavily urban areas
have -combined to multiply the instances of discontent sufficient
to motivate a judicial challenge of a route determination. This
increased frequency of judicial challenges to highway routings has
highlighted problems for which a court can only effectuate
case-by-case solutions. Resolution of those underlying problems
which create such litigation can only be achieved through im-
provements in the administrative routing procedures themselves.
Ultimate responsibility for the inadequacy of present highway
routing procedures rests with no one person or group. These
procedures were originally designed to solve the narrow problem
of engineering a highway from situs A to situs B and they have
succeeded remarkably well. It is recognized today, however, that
the route selection process involves more than a minimum-cost
analysis of alternatives. Highway location and design is intimately
related to questions of sociological and environmental planning.
Yet this relationship is still frequently ignored and the route
selection process continues to operate in a vacuum isolated from
12 Such misunderstandings frequently stem from a breakdown in communications between
the two groups. This may occur when one side obtains its information primarily from
newspapers or other public media and the information is partially untrue, or, taken
out of context, is misleading. Usually a simple clarification of each side's position will
lead to renewed amicability. At least it can lead to adjustments which resolve the
temporary impasse. These "easy" problems can frequently be solved entirely within
the administrative context.
13 This may be so despite the availability of a procedure allowing informal appeal to the
Federal Highway Administrator. Because the procedure is not documented, its avail-
ability is unknown to one who might otherwise make use of it.
14 Some states have adopted binding route arbitration to resolve disputes. For example, see
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9-1095, (51)-(58) (1968) and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 161.17(2)
(1960). For a discussion of the Minnesota statute, see Tippy, Review of Route
Selections for the FederalAid Highway Systems, 27 MONT. L. REV. 131, 145 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Tippy].
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these broader concerns. This seems to be largely the result of a
failure to properly define the problem. Without an initial con-
sensus on the relevant factors, the development of standards on
which to base a more intelligent selection process is impossible.
The current lack of standards is detrimental to the entire rout-
ing system. Administrators have no guidelines to help them better
evaluate route alternatives. As a consequence their decisions are
more susceptible to unfounded judicial challenge because parties
have no valid minimum standards against which to weigh whether
a given decision constituted an abuse of discretion.
The absence of standards not only increases the likelihood that
an abuse may occur, but also that it will go unchallenged, for
again citizens lack any background against which to evaluate the
relative merits of their cause. Resultant uncertainty may cause
them to undervalue the strength of a favorable case for relief and
forego a court challenge. If there is a judicial challenge, the court
will have no guidelines for review, resulting in diseconomy at best
and possibly a poor decision.
However, the selection process itself can serve as a valuable
breeding-ground for needed standards. Recognizing this, the Bu-
reau of Public Roads has promulgated a new Policy and Proce-
dure Memorandum (PPM) designed to alleviate some of the ma-
jor sources of friction between the administrators and the public
in the route selection process. 15 At the same time, the Memo-
15 34 Fed. Reg. 727(1969). All references herein for the Memorandum are to the Federal
Register. At the time of printing the Memorandum is not yet incorporated as an
addendum to the Code of Federal Regulations. The original proposal seemed to
envision promulgation of new Federal Regulations, not a Policy and Procedure
Memorandum. 33 Fed. Reg. 15663 (1968). However,
a number of comments objected to the issue of the proce-
dure in the form of a proposed new Part 3 and recom-
mended instead that, if the procedures were to be issued
at all, they be issued in the form of a Bureau of Public
Roads Policy and Procedure Memorandum (PPM). This
recommendation has been adopted. (34 Fed. Reg. at 727)
When the Federal-aid Highway Act was enacted in 1956, a Federal Bureau which
had final authority but lacked the ultimate expertise of the state highway depart-
ments was confronted with the problem of providing direction in an area in tre-
mendous flux without alienating the state-level groups with which it had to work. One
vehicle which the Bureau of Public Roads found well suited to this dual task was the
Policy and Procedure Memorandum. The Memorandum was flexible. It could re-
[Vol. 3:2
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randum introduced new elements into the process which could
lead to the formulation of needed guidelines for that process.
This article examines the legal barriers which have been con-
fronted in the courts by those challenging administratively deter-
mined highway routes and, in so doing, it traces these legal
barriers to their sources within the routing structure itself.16
Against this backdrop, the article analyzes the Policy and Proce-
dure Memorandum, indicating some of the problems which it will
resolve and offering suggestions for those it will not resolve.
II. Judicial Challenge of Routing Decisions
A. The Problem of Standing
Judicial challenges of highway routings have traditionally oc-
curred in contested eminent domain proceedings. 17 In large part,
however, judicial review in the eminent domain proceeding con-
centrated solely on the procedural aspects of the routing determi-
nation, seeking assurance that minimal due process had been
observed.' Most courts avoided a determination of the necessity
for taking in condemnation any particular parcel of land, charac-
spond to rapid change as experience shed light on old problems and new difficulties
arose. It had the flexibility which statutes sometimes lack. Yet the Memorandum was
not law, a feature distinctly noticeable to state-level adminstrators. As a result, the
Memorandum did little to antagonize state groups. Law would have bound the
administrator and the person administered alike. The Memorandum, as a policy
statement, was more than a suggestion, but could not be enforced against an adminis-
trator if disregarded. It is effective only between successive administrative levels and,
even then, the degree of implementation depends largely on the working arrangement
between those levels. The Memorandum was the practical and politic answer to the
needs of the time; it was expedient and it was, significantly, a very successful
temporary solution to pressing problems.
16 Although this article deals primarily with the Federal-aid Highway System, much herein
is applicable to route determination for roadways funded exclusively at the state and
local levels.
17 This collateral attack was available because, in theory at least, the burden was on the
condemnor to show the necessity for any taking of land. In practice, this burden was
slight because mere selection of the route by the condemnor was prima facie proof of
necessity. The burden of showing lack of all necessity lay with the person whose
property was to be taken. Tippy, supra note 14, at 135-140; compare, Texas Eastern
Transmission Corporation v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130
(1966), in which the burdens of going forward were judicially reversed.
18 Tippy, supra note 14, at 140.
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terizing the issue as a "political," "administrative" or "legisla-
tive" question which the courts could not decide.1 9 Even in that
minority of courts which allowed review of the necessity for
taking the contestant landowner's particular parcel, 20 the con-
demnee was usually confronted with a difficult burden of proof.
To overturn the administrative decision, the condemnee was re-
quired to show fraud, bad faith, or an abuse of discretion by the
administrative body.2 1
Since the condemnation proceeding was open only to those
persons whose property was to be taken, an additional problem
faced one whose property was not to be condemned, but who,
nevertheless, felt aggrieved by a particular route selection. The
absence of a recognized "individual legal right" which would be
infringed by the administrative determination, other than own-
ership of property to be taken, often resulted in judicial refusal to
review state-selected routes because the individual lacked requis-
ite "standing." 22
19 Id. Characterization of the question as one which courts would not determine also seems
proper. The typical judicial attitude was expressed in Department of Public Works &
Buildings v. Lewis, 411 I1. 242, 103 N.E. 2d 595 (1952) where landowners com-
plained of "lack of necessity" in a condemnation proceeding against their property for
a federal-aid highway improvement. The court waid at 597:
The general rule is that, where the right of eminent
domain is granted, the necessity for its exercise, within
constitutional restrictions, is not a judicial question, and
its exercise is not a proper subject for judicial in-
terference or control unless to prevent a clear abuse of
such power.20 See, for example, Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook County v. Kean, 298 Ill. 37, 131 N.E.
117 (1921).211n the absence of a controlling statute, the general rule which seems to
be followed is that a finding of necessity by the con-
demnor will not be disturbed in the absence of fraud, bad
faith, or gross abuse of discretion on the part of the
condemnor. Contentions by landowners that the highway
might be better constructed in a different location than
that proposed by the highway authorities almost in-
variably are unsuccessful. Helstad, Recent Trends in
Highway Condemnation Law, 1964 WASH. U.L.Q. 58,
60-I.
See also Netherton, Implementation of Land Use Policy: Police Power v. Eminent
Domain, 3 LAND & WATER L. REV. 33, 40 (1968).22There are property owners among the plaintiffs who own property the
value of which may be reduced by the projects involved
in this action. They have no standing to sue because they
May 19701 Highway Routing
Expansion of the traditionally narrow concept of standing has
resulted from concurrent developments in both the legislature and
the courts. The most significant statutory change has been the
Administrative Procedure Act which opens courts to "persons
aggrieved." 23 The courts have shown an apparent willingness to
implement these statutory provisions quite liberally. 24 Even in the
absence of expansive statutory language, courts have been broad-
ening the parameters of recognized standing. 25 Scenic Hudson
have no legal personal rights that are being adversely
affected. Some of the individual plaintiffs claim to be
users of public parks within the area of the projects and
they contend that their rights to use the parks will be
interfered with. They have no rights separate and apart
from the rest of the public and they have no standing to
sue. D.C. Federation of Civic Associations, Inc. v. Airis,
275 F. Supp. 533, 537 (1967), reversed, 391 F. 2d 478
(D.C. Cir. 1968).
Civic associations, conservation interests and religious groups have been among the
most prevalent aggrieved "non-property" owners.23 A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the mean-
ing of a relevant statute, is entitled to a judicial review
thereof. 5 U.S.C.A. § 702 (1966)._
"Aggrieved persons" language is also found in the Communications Act of 1934, 48
STAT. 1093 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 402 (b) (6) (1964) and in the Federal
Power Act, infra note 27.
24 See discussion in text of Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power
Commission, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied. 384 U.S. 941, (1966), infra at
note 26; and Bedford v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), infra at note 33.
2 Some courts did so on the ground that citizens may act as "private attorneys general" in
protecting "public rights." Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions,
74 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1281-83 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Jaffe, Public Actions].
Other courts expanded standing through judicial implementation of statutorily
created legal rights or through increased awareness that legal rights previously unrec-
ognized in the courts did, in fact, exist. These latter two arose as an individual sought
to protect his private interests. See Jaffe, Private Actions 75 HARV. L. REV. 255
(1961).
More than one basis for standing may be present in any given case. When this
occurs, it may be difficult to perceive which asserted basis a court has found per-
suasive. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission, 354
F.2d 608 may be such a case. There the court seemed to read the Federal Power Act
as a sufficient grant of standing. However, the court also recognized that the legisla-
ture had either created or had itself recognized the existence of "legal rights."
"... [M]embers of the public have rights in our recreational, historic and scenic
resources under the Federal Power Act." 354 F.2d at 614. The former basis seems
correct. "We hold that the Federal Power Act gives petitioners a legal right to protect
their special interest," at 616. In other words the Act granted standing per se and not
the "legal right" status from which standing necessarily flows.
374 Prospectus [Vol. 3:2
Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission,26 ex-
emplifies the inquiry process which courts now undertake in de-
termining whether one has the requisite standing to obtain judicial
review of an administrative decision under statutory "aggrieved
persons" language. The court relied on section 313(b) of the
Federal Power Act2 7 in finding that petitioners had standing,
specifically rejecting the government's contention that " 'petition-
ers do not have standing to obtain review [because they] make no
claim of any personal economic injury' resulting from the Com-
mission's action."2 8
Scenic Hudson is important also because it presents four basic
propositions which count heavily toward a successful judicial
challenge of a highway route decision: (1) the standing of ag-
grieved parties does not depend on whether they have suffered
direct economic injury; 29 (2) "[r]epresentation of common in-
terests by an organization such as Scenic Hudson serves to limit
the number of those who might otherwise apply for intervention
and serves to expedite the administrative process;"30 (3) there are
26354 F. 2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied. 384 U.S. 941 (1966). In this case, popularly
known as Storm King, a citizen's association and three New York towns sought
review of an order of the Federal Power Commission granting Consolidated Edison a
license to construct a pumped-storage hydro-electric facility on the Hudson River at
Storm King Mountain. Petitioners who had been parties to the original administrative
proceedings (compare Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v.
F.C.C., 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) at note 30 infra, and text accompanying note
36 infra) sought to have the case remanded to the FPC for further hearings. A
primary contention was that inadequate consideration had been given to possible
alternative locations for the project.
27Any party to a proceeding under this chapter aggrieved by an order
issued by the Commission in such proceeding may obtain
a review of such order in the United States Court of
Appeals for any Circuit wherein the licensee or public
utility to which the order relates is located. 16 U.S.CA. §
8251(b) (1960)28Scenic Hudson v. F.P.C., 354 F.2d at 615.
29 ld.
30 354 F.2d at 617. The court was addressing itself to the government contention that to
allow standing here would result in "court flooding." The position taken by the court
is a realistic one. As the court itself recognized, "[tihe expense and vexation of legal
proceedings is not lightly undertaken." (Id.) . To argue that the challenge would or
even could be borne by any individual, let alone by large numbers in individual
challenges, taxes reality. This idea was also expressed in United Church of Christ
where the court reversed the decision of the Federal Communications Commission
and permitted members of a radio station's listening audience to intervene in license
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factors other than the economic or engineering which must be
given adequate consideration in the decisional process and which
the court will scrutinize to ascertain whether there has been an
abuse of administrative discretion;3 1 and (4) ". . . the existence of
a more desirable alternative" may be advanced by an aggrieved
party as one of the ". . factors which enters into a determination
of whether a particular proposal would serve the public con-
venience and necessity." 3 2
All four factors appeared shortly after Scenic Hudson in a suit
challenging a proposed highway routing. In Bedford v. Boyd,33 an
action for a preliminary injunction, the court considered the mer-
its of a claim that the Secretary of Transportation and the acting
Secretary of Commerce had acted arbitrarily in compelling the
State of New York to construct a portion of the national in-
terstate highway system along the route chosen. Those advocat-
ing an alternate route included two conservation groups, a
self-proclaimed community development association, residents of
the town to be affected, and the town itself. Discussing plaintiffs'
standing to challenge the route determination, the court reviewed
the reasoning of Scenic Hudson, analogizing the provisions of the
Federal Power Act there under consideration to the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act claimed to grant standing in Bedford.
The Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C.
§ 702) entitles a person who is "aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a rele-
vant statute," to obtain judicial review of that
action. The "relevant statute" in this instance
is the Federal Highways Act. That Act ex-
renewal proceedings. The court construed the "persons aggrieved" language of the
Federal Communications Act of 1934 (48 STAT. 1093 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§ 402(b)(6)(1958)) in rejecting the Commission's claim that "standing [to appear
before the Commission] is based on invasion of a legally protected interest of (sic)
injury direct and substantial and that petitioners.., can assert no greater interest or
claim of injury than members of the general public." 359 F.2d at 999.
3' 354 F.2d at 616.
32 354 F.2d at 617. The prevailing judicial attitude toward the highway challenge had been
that the existence of an alternative was not a factor for the consideration of the court.
For example, see Dept. of Public Works & Buildings v. Lewis, 411 Ill. 242, 103
N.E.2d 595 (1952), supra note 19 (presentation of an alternative route in con-
demnation proceeding presents an engineering and not a judicial question).
33 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
May 1970]
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presses the intent that "local needs, to the
extent practicable, suitable, and feasible, shall
be given equal consideration with the needs
of interstate commerce." (23 U.S.C.
§ l11(b)) A project, among other things, is
"to conform to the particular needs of each
locality." (23 U.S.C. § 109(a) ).34
The court declared:
[T]hese provisions are sufficient, under the
principle of Scenic Hudson, to manifest a
congressional intent that towns, local civic
organizations, and conservation groups are to
be considered "aggrieved" by agency action
which has allegedly disregarded their in-
terests. I see no reason why the word "ag-
grieved" should have a different meaning in
the Administrative Procedure Act from the
meaning given to it under the Federal Power
Act. 3
5
The court thus felt expressly warranted in extending the rationale
of Scenic Hudson to allow these plaintiffs to bring an independent
action for judicial review of the administrators' decision, although
they had not been formal parties to the administrative proceed-
ing.3 6
As with Scenic Hudson, it could plausibly be argued that Boyd
was not an unusual application of the concept of standing because
of the peculiarly public character of the conservation interests
before the courts.3 7 However, a subsequent decision in the Sixth
34 270 F. Supp. at 660.
35 270 F. Supp. at 661.
36See note 26 supra.
37 For a case which might support one arguing this restrictive interpretation of Scenic
Hudson and Boyd, see Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F.
Supp. 1083 (1969). In deciding that the Sierra Club, a non-profit conservation corpo-
ration, had standing to maintain an action against the public officials charged with
construction of the proposed Hudson River Expressway, the court stated at 1092:
The rule, therefore, is that if the statutes involved in
the controversy are concerned with the protection of
natural, historic, and scenic resources, then a con-
gressional intent exists to give standing to groups
interested in these factors and who allege that these




Circuit suggests otherwise. In Nashville 1-40 Steering Committee
v. Ellington38 members of an unincorporated association of Negro
and white businessmen, teachers, ministers, civic and professional
leaders, and residents of the North Nashville, Tennessee area
through which the challenged highway had been routed, were
allowed to maintain an action seeking to enjoin construction along
the proposed route. Citing Scenic Hudson, the court said simply,
"Appellees urge that appellants [plaintiffs] have no standing to
maintain this action. We reject this contention." 39
The standing issue is merely the initial obstacle which a non-
property-owner must overcome. Other substantial barriers to re-
lief face both the property-owner and the non-property-owner as
judicial challengers.
B. Barriers to Relief
. Non-Reviewability
Prior absolute judicial deference to an administrative decision
has generally disappeared so that inquiry in a court challenge
to a highway routing no longer stops short of review of the
substantive claims against the selected route. 40 However, com-
This "rule" seems to replace the factual, statute-by-statute search for "congressional
intent" contemplated in Scenic Hudson and Boyd with aper se finding of "congres-
sional intent" upon a showing that a statute involved in a controversy is concerned
with the protection of natural, historic and scenic resources. This is neither an
accurate reading of either of those two cases nor an approach which is necessarily
valid without independent analysis, even though it may coincidentally happen that
there will be no case in which a "conservation" statute will be found to contain no
"congressional intent" to grant standing to interested persons.
38387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied 390 U.S. 921 (1968).
39 387 F.2d at 182. Shortly after Ellington was decided, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia granted an injunction against District of Columbia and federal
highway officials, forbidding them to proceed with the construction of four highways
for failure to comply with the proper statutory procedure for route designation. D.C.
Federation of Civic Associations, Inc. v. Airis, 391 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
Plaintiffs, individual District of Columbia taxpayers, landowners affected by the
challenged highways and the Democratic Central Committee for the District of
Columbia, had been dismissed in the lower court for lack of standing. D.C. Feder-
ation of Civic Associations, Inc. v. Airis, 275 F. Supp. 533 (D.C. Dist. 1967) (see
note 22 supra). This issue was reversed without discussion on appeal.
40 See notes 18-21 supra, and accompanying text.
It is probable that a threshold liberalization of judicial willingness to examine the
content of a routing decision was a necessary prerequisite to the expanded concept of
May 1970)
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plainants are still frequently faced with the contention that the
administrative decision may not be reviewed by a court. For
example, in Boyd, defendants Secretary of Commerce and Feder-
al Highway Administrator moved to dismiss on the ground that
their decision could not be reviewed in the courts. In denying the
motion, the Court noted the ". .. trend of recent scholarly com-
ment in favor of judicial review of so-called 'legislative' adminis-
trative acts," and concluded:
I see nothing in the Highways Act which
indicates a congressional intent to immunize
the Bureau of Public Roads from judicial
scrutiny of its acts. Moreover, the new De-
partment of Transportation Act specifically
makes the Administrative Procedure Act ap-
plicable to proceedings under the Act. 49
U.S.C. § 1655(h).... To hold that these deci-
sions cannot be reviewed, no matter how ar-
bitrary they may be, would be unsound and
unjust.4 1
This approach is rapidly gaining adherents. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has held that the Administrative Procedure Act establishes
a presumption in favor of judicial review so that the court should
restrict access to judicial review only upon a clear showing that
the legislative intent is that there be no judicial review. 42
standing. Historic judicial recitals of "lack of standing" may have been nothing more
than a convenient scapegoat for dismissal of actions in which a court discerned that it
could grant no relief on the merits under traditionally correct legal principles. Until
there was a readiness to advance simultaneously in the areas of standing and substan-
tive review, to "advance" in either would have been futile. The recognition by the
legislature of "persons aggrieved" as proper parties complainant against adminis-
trative decisions seemed to stimulate the substantive review in the courts. The courts
seemed to take the attitude that the bare right to review was of little value unless a
remedy was available. Courts seem to have interpreted the statutory language as
implying that their earlier decisions, which had characterized administrative determi-
nations as "political," "legislative," or "administrative" and therefore not subject to
review, had been legislatively overruled. A narrow interpretation of statutory "per-
sons aggrieved" language would have allowed persons formerly unable to obtain
review to challenge only the procedural validity of a contested route determination. A
pre-existing connection in the minds of judges between standing and substantive
review and the possibility of relief would help explain the concurrent expansion of
both.4 1Bedford v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. at 659-660.
42 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
[Vol. 3:2
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2. Burden of Persuasion
Unfortunately, a formidable burden of persuasion has replaced
earlier judicial reluctance to review these administrative deci-
sions. For instance, the remedy sought in Boyd was an injunction,
normally available on a showing of irreparable injury, lack of an
adequate remedy at law, and proof that the act sought to be
enjoined is illegal or unauthorized. 43 The latter requirement, in
cases challenging an administrative decision, usually includes
proof of an abuse of the limits of the statutory discretion granted
to the administrative body. This is often a difficult burden to meet
because the discretion granted to the highway administrator is
usually stated in broad terms. 44 The challengers in Boyd failed to
overcome this difficult burden of persuasion. The court recog-
nized the degree of proof required, saying, "the [administrative]
decision must be allowed to stand unless it was plainly wrong,"
and concluded that ". . . this administrative decision was not
wrong enough to permit this court to upset it." 45 [Emphasis
added]
43 Tippy, supra note 14, at 140.
44 In Pennsylvania, for example, the only standards to guide the Pennsylvania Secretary of
Highways in the exercise of his discretion in locating highways outside cities are that
such location be made "... in order to correct danger or inconvenience to the
traveling public, or lessen the cost to the Commonwealth in the construction, reconst-
ruction, or maintenance thereof." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 670-210 (1961).
45 Boyd, 270 F. Supp. at 663. The complainants in Ellington, 387 F.2d 179 ran into a
similar problem, though it arose in a different procedural guise. In Ellington, the
Court of Appeals reviewed the denial of a preliminary injunction pending a hearing on
the merits of plaintiffs' claims. Since the denial of this injunction is discretionary with
the trial judge, the initially high burden of persuasion was compounded by appeal at
this early stage. Though hindsight shows that an appeal at this stage was perhaps a
tactical error because of the compounded burden of persuasion, delaying the appeal
until after a hearing on the merits would probably have resulted in laches. See
discussion of the laches problem, infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. The court
did evince reluctance in the denial of plaintiffs' appeal. "Under the standards of
judicial review in this type of action we conclude that, despite the showing of heavy
damage to the North Nashville area, we have no choice except to affirm... " at 185.
The heavy damage referred to occurred solely in the Negro section of the city. The
main business street was to be gravely affected by closings and relocations; a public
park used predominantly by Negroes was to be destroyed; and traffic reroutings were
to funnel many cars through the center of Fisk University, at 186. See also SAT.
EVENING POST, Dec. 14, 1968, at 22. Somewhat surprisingly, the court noted that
there had as yet been no formal approval of the route by the Department of Trans-
portation. Accordingly, the court stated at 186:
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3. Laches- The Expended Sums
There 's a com.plex tactica I e. sion that must be made by one
contemplating a judicial challenge to a proposed routing. On the
one hand, the administrative remedies must be exhausted. 46 Yet
to delay the legal battle might well result in the equitable defense
of laches.
The most prominent element of the laches defense raised
against challengers of a chosen routing is monetary cost. Substan-
tial expenditures, composed primarily of engineering and
right-of-way acquisition costs, have usually been made before the
judicial challenge is undertaken. To a large extent these expenses
are dictated by the routing process itself.47 The nature of federal
appropriations and funding also encourages a certain "spend-
it-while-you-have-it" attitude. 48
[W]e cannot presume the Department of Transportation
will fail to give consideration to possible revisions in the
plans and specifications so as to alleviate as much as
feasible the grave consequences which this record shows
will be imposed under the present plans upon the North
Nashville community.
This could have been a simple statement of fact, an understated hint at failure to have
exhausted all administrative remedies, or an admonition directed to the Department
of Transportation. The tenor of the opinion, though not its holding, indicates that the
court may have had the third possibility foremost in its mind.
46The Administrative Procedure Act precludes judicial review of acts committed by law to
the discretion of the agency. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a)(1964). Because highway routing is
largely a discretionary matter, judicial challenges must arise under that portion of the
act which allows review of "final agency action for which there is no other adequate
remedy in the court... " Emphasis added] 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1964).
47 The enormity of the projects requires that all possible measures, including the
pre-acquisition of rights-of-way, be employed to avoid what might otherwise result in
inordinate delays in project completion and consequent spiraling of construction
costs. See note 10, supra.
48 At least one court has taken judicial notice of this fact. In State Road Dept. of Fla. v.
Southland, Inc., 117 So.2d 512 (Fla. 1960) the court said at 516:
This court takes judicial notice of the fact that funds for
the construction of the interstate system are budgeted,
received and expended on an annual basis .... The lack
of funds in any given fiscal year to commence immediate
construction of a segment of the interstate highway
which has been surveyed, located and duly designated,
should not be a bar to the Department's authority to
acquire by eminent domain the rights-of-way necessary
for such highways, even though for financial reasons
construction must necessarily be deferred to a future
date within the time limits of the overall interstate high-
way program.
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The court in Boyd was well aware of the costs involved;
approximately $9,000,000 had been committed under a construc-
tion contract for labor, materials and equipment; the state had
spent more than $ 1,000,000 to engineer the proposed route and
$200,000 had been used to acquire rights-of-way. The court fore-
saw only chaos should the route be enjoined. In addition, "sub-
stantial delay, perhaps amounting to over two years, would be
encountered before a new route could be surveyed and engi-
neered." 49 There had been a nine-month delay between the High-
way Administrator's route selection and the institution of the
challenging suit. "In the meantime both federal and state author-
ities have changed their position in reliance upon that decision.
This comes perilously close to laches. At the very least it is a
factor which this court must take into account." 50
A related problem arises when a timely challenge is made but
the opposed project is completed before there can be any final
judicial determination on appeal. In Washington Park, Inc. Ap-
peal51 complainant condemnee obtained an order halting con-
struction of a road until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could
convene in the Fall term to hear the case on appeal. Although it
appeared that the three-month construction delay that would re-
sult would inconvenience no one and that, absent the delay, the
project would be completed "by the time the autumn leaves fell,"
the order halting construction was overturned by other members
The Highway Act itself includes an "urgency clause," making rapid completion of
the system an important consideration in any decision. 23. U.S.C. § 101(1964).49 Bedford v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. at 664.
50270 F. Supp. at 664. The Ellington case is an excellent example of what can occur.
There the chosen route had been substantially the same for ten years and
$10,000,000 had already been spent for engineering and land acquisition before a suit
challenging the route was initiated. 387 F.2d at 184. Plaintiffs claimed that whenever
interested persons had inquired about the status of the disputed route over those
years "they were told that the route was 'preliminary' and 'subject to change.' " SAT.
EVENING POST, supra note 45, at 24. The court stated at 186 that "[it also is to be
regretted that appellants [complainants] waited so late to begin their efforts to correct
the grave consequences which will result from the construction of this highway."
However, appellants' alternatives were not clear. A premature resort to the courts
would have resulted in a clear failure to have exhausted administrative remedies. On
the other hand, a challenge instituted after the decisional process is complete often
faces afait accompli. See also note 46 supra, and accompanying test.
51425 Pa. 349 (1967).
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of the Supreme Court. The roadway was then apparently com-
pleted before the appeal was heard, thus rendering the issue moot.
This situation presents more than "laches" in a tacit form. As
the dissent clearly noted, 52 there was no possible remedy had the
court found, on appeal, that there had in fact been an uncon-
stitutional taking or denial of due process as the complainant
alleged. It seems inexplicable that the court, in effect, foreclosed
itself from any decision other than the one reached.
4. Piecemeal Construction
Construction of the federal-aid highway system is necessarily
a "piecemeal" process. There is neither the administrative and
engineering capacity nor the funds to proceed on any other basis.
This piecemeal construction approach can result in a suit chal-
lenging the "link-up" section of highway needed to connect two
previously completed portions. A challenge in this posture begins
in a most disadvantageous position. It has been observed by a
court:
Only chaos can result if local law or munici-
pal corporations across the nation may block
the progress of construction, and prevent the
logical and planned extension and connection
of those completed projects to achieve the
interstate system envisioned by Congress. 53
52 In a typically vigorous opinion dissenting from affirmance of the lower court holding,
Musmanno, J., castigated the majority for their handling of the case.
Nothing can be more important in law than preservation
of the res, the thing in controversy, until the Court de-
cides its fate. .. . The time to decide whether a road
should or should not be constructed was before the
steam shovels, bulldozers, and concrete mixers joined in
a mighty welding operation to tie together in perpetual
bond a solid structure that could never be reduced to its
original elements again .... The appeal was finally heard
and now the Majority has affirmed the action of the court
below. It could not do otherwise. It would be folly to
order the destruction of $500,000 worth of road building.
The concrete cannot be liquified and transmuted into
gold to put back into the State's trea-
sury .... Washington Park was denied due process be-
cause its property right was physically destroyed when
the supersedeas was dissolved. 425 Pa. at 360-361,
363-364.
For an example of a case whose handling contrasts markedly with the injudicious
disposition found here, see note 53.
53 United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 209 F. Supp. 483, 490 (S.D.llI. 1962), Affrd
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All of the above problems constitute barriers to obtaining relief
from an undesired highway routing. However, some of these
barriers are simply manifestations of the routing process itself;
they can be traced to no specific deficiency in the procedure, but
are only incidental effects of that procedure. The "link-up" prob-
lem exemplifies this kind of barrier. This obstacle is little more
than an inevitable effect of the piecemeal construction approach
sub. nom. United States v. Pleasure Driveway and Park District of Peoria, Ill., 314
F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963). The case involved an eminent domain proceeding against a
city park. The land under dispute lay between two previously completed sections of
one highway in the interstate system.
A problem related to both "laches" and "piecemeal construction" may arise if
different agencies are successively responsible for elements of what is essentially one
joint decision. In such a situation, a failure to consider all agencies' decisions con-
currently will foreclose any choice in the agency last to render a decision due to the
prior expenditures made in reliance on the approval of the agency which first consid-
ered the project.
Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083 (1969) is
an example of the type of difficulty which can arise. The court accepted plaintiffs'
contention that a river-fill permit granted as part of a highway construction project
had issued illegally from the Army Corps of Engineers due to the Corps' failure to
secure Congress' approval as required by statute. The court then went on to declare
that the Corps must simultaneously seek the statutorily required approval of the
Secretary of Transportation for a causeway which was part of the same overall
project, even though the causeway was not part of the fill project which the Corps
could seemingly (with consent of Congress) independently authorize. The court
reasoned that the Corps' failure to obtain the Transportation Secretary's approval:
... effectively relinquished the jurisdiction of the federal
Department of Transportation, and its discretion to deny
the approval of the future causeway, for how could the
Secretary of Transportation deny the future request, if he
were to be so inclined, after the enormous expense and
work the State would have already put into the project.
302 F. Supp. at 1089- 1090.
In conclusion the court stated:
Such a piecemeal approach ... would also frustrate one
of the main purposes of the Department of Trans-
portation Act, i.e., the conservation of the country's nat-
ural resources .... If this massive fill project is com-
pleted before [Secretary of Transportation] approval is
sought, he will be presented with a fait accompli. There
will not be any need for him to consider the effects on
natural resources as the harm, if any, will be done.
Id., at 1090.
The court is to be commended for its administrative handling of this case. The
Second Circuit, recognizing the irreparable harm which could result from any dump-
ing of fill before the appeal, ordered an immediate trial on the merits while denying
plaintiffs' appeal for a preliminary injunction. Through prompt action, the court was
able to render a decision on the merits less than six months after the initial grant of
the permit, preserving revocation of the permit as a viable alternative. Compare
Washington Park, discussed in text at note 52 supra.
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which fails to adequately forewarn interested landowners. This is
not true, however, of all barriers to relief; many can be traced to
an operational failure of the system itself.
IV. Procedural Deficiencies in the Highway Routing Process
A. Stale Data
One problem caused primarily by the "piecemeal" method of
highway construction is that information, current when consid-
ered, may have become stale by the time funds are available for
construction; that is, the information is no longer accurate. The
limited availability of federal funds and the fact that further delay
may increase land acquisition costs not only hastens the initial
findings, possibly causing oversight and miscalculation, but also
inhibits later review of those decisions. It is conceivable that cost
estimates once validly favoring one route may have changed
dramatically by the time construction has begun. When a judicial
challenge arises, however, the route chosen on the basis of the
earlier estimates, now outdated, is staunchly defended. In Boyd,
for example, a cost differential of $4.3 million between two routes
was a major factor underlying recommendation and approval of
the route chosen. Yet in the ten-month period from February,
1966, when a cost of $18.8 million was used to justify the chosen
route, to November, 1966, when estimates were made prior to
requesting bids for construction contracts, the estimated cost of
the chosen route had risen one-hundred forty-eight percent. 54
Thus, route determination had been made on the basis of cost
figures which were startlingly unrealistic and out-of-date less than
one year later.
B. Public Hearing
The primary safeguard against administrative error through
failure to gather all relevant data before arriving at a decision
54Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Bedford v.




should be the public hearing. Yet the present failure to provide
for a public hearing has been held insufficient to warrant judicial
relief.55 The denial of a public hearing, leaving judicial challenge
as the only alternative, puts the interested party at an immediate
disadvantage. The proceeding before the courts is adversary in
nature, not informational, as the public hearing should be. The
participant in a public hearing may present his facts relatively
unburdened. The person challenging a routing decision in court,
however, is confronted with: (1) administrators defending a route
which they have selected, and in which they have a vested in-
terest, against a charge of arbitrariness or abuse of discretion; and
(2) a burden of persuasion which is not present at an adminis-
trative hearing. Facts adduced at a hearing can be much more
persuasive because presented in a relatively neutral setting. Ten-
der of the same facts at trial is an uphill struggle.
It can be assumed that the function of any highway routing
procedure should be to bring as many factors to bear on the
routing problem as is possible. However, routing administrators
have often failed to consider relevant factors simply because
existing procedures are not adequate for this purpose. To remedy
the problem, the Bureau of Public Roads promulgated a new
Policy and Procedure Memorandum. 56
55 Hoffman v. Stevens, 177 F. Supp. 898 (M.D. Pa. 1959i held that the purpose of the
public hearing provision of the Federal-aid Highways Act of 1958 (Pub. L. 85-767,
72 STAT. 902, 23 U.S.C. § 128) was not protection of the rights of a concerned party,
but assurance that federal funds would be properly expended.
A distinctly contrasting view of the role of the public hearing was set forth in D.C.
Federation of Civic Associations, Inc. v. Airis, 391 F.2d 478 (1968). There, in
reversing and remanding, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that District officials entrusted with highway planning for the District were not
authorized to disregard section 7-115 of the District Code which requires a public
hearing before approval of a highway plan. The court said at 484:
The public hearing required by § 7-115 offers the public
an opportunity to participate in the administrative deci-
sion and forces the administrators to spell out the rea-
sons for their decision-a check and balance basic to our
entire system of government.
Although Airis did not deal directly with the Federal Act, the approach and philoso-
phy are nonetheless distinctly applicable.
5634 Fed. Reg. 727 (1969), See also note 15, supra.
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V. Development of an Effective Routing Procedure
To ensure that the views of all are effectively presented, a
procedure is required which affords each interested party the
opportunity to interpose his views at an early stage in the pro-
ceedings. The Bureau of Public Roads recognized the absence of
early access to the route selection system as one of its chief
weaknesses.
The rules, policies, and procedures estab-
lished by this PPM are intended to afford full
opportunity for effective public participation
in the consideration of highway location and
design proposals by highway departments be-
fore submission to the Federal Highway Ad-
ministration for approval. They provide a me-
dium for free and open discussion and are
designed to encourage early and amicable
resolution of controversial issues that may
arise.57
Whether the PPM in fact accomplishes its avowed purpose is
open to question.
A. The Dual Hearing Procedure
1. Structure
The basic innovative feature of the Policy and Procedure
Memorandum is a dual hearing procedure:
Both a corridor public hearing and a design
public hearing must be held, or an opportun-
ity afforded for those hearings, with respect
to each Federal-aid highway project that:
(1) Is on a new location; or(2) Would have a substantially different so-
cial, economic or environmental effect; or(3) Would esentially change the layout or
function of connecting roads or streets.58[Emphasis added]
571d. at 728, § I.
58 1d. at 729, § 6(a). The PPM also anticipates the problems which could arise due to a
"change of plans" after a public hearing has been held:
[Vol. 3:2
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The corridor public hearing is a conscious effort to afford
interested persons an opportunity to express their views on the
location of a federal-aid highway at a stage when flexibility of
response to proffered suggestions still exists.
A "corridor public hearing" is a public hear-
ing that:
(1) Is held before the route location is ap-
proved and before the State highway de-
partment is committed to a specific pro-
posal;
(2) Is held to ensure that an opportunity is
afforded for effective participation by in-
terested persons in the process of deter-
mining the need for, and the location of, a
Federal-aid highway; and
(3) Provides a public forum that affords a
full opportunity for presenting views on
each of the proposed alternative highway
locations, and the social, economic, and
environmental effects of those alternate lo-
cations.59
The opportunity for another public hearing shall be
afforded in any case where proposed locations or designs
are so changed from those presented in the notices speci-
fied above or at a public hearing as to have a substan-
tially different social, economic, or environmental effect.
(§ 7(c) ).
Note that the PPM only requires that an opportunity be afforded for the hearings
whenever federal funds are involved. As long as the procedure for requesting the
hearing is not too complex, and the public is well informed as to that procedure, the
PPM public hearings will be effectively available to interested persons. The PPM
does presently require, however, that the procedure for requesting a public hearing be
explained in the published notices of opportunity for a public hearing. (§ 7(a) ).
59 1d. at 728, § 4(a). For the definition of "social, economic, and environmental effects," see
note 63 infra. Despite language to the contrary in the Memorandum, to infer that
there will be an opportunity to discuss the need for a federal-aid highway at the
corridor public hearing is misleading. The earlier version of the Memorandum envis-
ioned a corridor public hearing which would. focus specifically on the question of
alternative methods of transportation. See note 15 supra. The promulgated Memo-
randum recognized the "validity of the contention that the public has the right to
actively participate in that ['highway-no highway'] decision," but realized that this
issue must be explored at a much earlier stage. As a result, the Bureau expressed an
intent to amend other Memoranda to require that interested persons be allowed to
express their views with respect to the choice among alternative modes of trans-
portation. 34 Fed. Reg. 727 (1969). Administrative minds may have retained the
wording here to indicate that an earlier determination that a highway facility is the
answer to a transportation problem (as opposed to, say, a monorail or subway
system) is not necessarily conclusive, but may be reconsidered in the light of data
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Growing realization that aesthetic, conservation, recreation
and related considerations are legitimate components of the rout-
ing process prompted the creation of the highway design public
hearing. This hearing is held after route approval, following the
corridor hearing, and:
[p]rovides a public forum that affords a full
opportunity for presenting views on major
highway design features, including the social,
economic, environmental, and other effects of
alternate designs. 60
The two public hearings are of equal importance. It is now
recognized that, although highways are programmed, planned and
projected for the foreseeable use-requirements of a twenty-year
period,61 the roadways themselves will last for more than fifty
years.62 Because of this fifty-year life span for roadways, the
determinative impact of a new highway is greater than its deter-
mined usefulness; that is, roadways will continue to influence
other planning decisions long after their peak usefulness has been
attained. It has thus become imperative not only to project urban
growth rates and usages, but to attempt to envision what the very
concepts of "city" and "transportation" will be in the year two
thousand twenty. This requires serious consideration of those
"social, economic, or environmental" effects 63 which both hear-
ings are intended to examine.
acquired subsequent to that decision, including that received at the public hearing. An
argument can be made for delaying the final mode-determination until all the engi-
neering studies have been completed prior to the corridor public hearing. However,
the type of information needed to determine the relative feasibility of one form of
transportation as against another seems to be much broader than information devel-
oped in support of highway route locations would be. In any event, to indicate that
the decision will be delayed until the corridor hearing is misleading. Anyone waiting
until then to enter the decisional process will have been effectively foreclosed from
participation in the determination of the type of system to be developed because of
the massive expenditures in pursuance of specific route selections. To allow public
access to the "highway-no highway" decision at a stage in the planning procedure
when there has been relatively little expended on any specific form of transportation,
as is now contemplated, should allow true public participation in that decision.
60 34 Fed. Reg. 727, supra note 15, at 722, § 4(b)(3).
61 23 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1964).
62 SAT. EVENING POST, supra note 45, at 27.
63 Social, economic, and environmental effects" means the direct and
indirect benefits or losses to the community and to high-
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2. A Standard to Rectify the Basic Weakness
Unfortunately, the Memorandum provides no explicit stan-
dards against which administrators can evaluate the relative mer-
its of the factors which must be considered in selecting a route. 64
In determining whether a net neighborhood loss of sixty homes
would justify increased expenditures along an alternate route, or
way users. It includes all such effects that are relevant
and applicable to the particular location or design under
consideration such as:








(9) Public health and safety.
(10) Residential and neighborhood character and loca-
tion.
(II) Religious institutions and practices.
(12) Conduct and financing of Government (including
effect on local tax base and social service costs).
(13) Conservation (including erosion, sedimentation,
wildlife and general ecology of the area).
(14) Natural and historic landmarks.
(15) Noise, and air and water pollution.
(16) Property value.
(17) Multiple use of space.
(18) Replacement housing.
(19) Education (including disruption of school district op-
erations).
(20) Displacement of families and businesses.
(21) Engineering, right-of-way and construction costs of
the project and related facilities.
(22) Maintenance and operating costs of the project and
related facilities.
(23) Operation and use of existing highway facilities and
other transportation facilities during construction and af-
ter completion.
This list of effects is not meant to be exclusive, nor does it mean that each effect
considered must be given equal weight in making a determination upon a particular
highway location or design. 34 Fed. Reg. 727, supra note 15, at 728-29, § 4(c).
Note that, because of the broad definition given here, the two hearings should be
available in the vast majority of Federal-aid highway projects. See text accompanying
note 58 supra. If there is any doubt whether a public hearing is required, the
opportunity for one must be afforded. 34 Fed. Reg. 727, supra note 15, at 729, § 7(d).
64 For a list of the factors, see note 63 supra.
Prospectus
in determining a feasible alternative to a route through a public
park, administrators receive no specific guidance from the Memo-
randum. it is, of course, impossible to draw guidelines for all
situations. Application would inevitably demand modification in
practice. Nevertheless, a general principle can be formulated
which sets a fundamental standard on which the route selector
must build. This fundamental standard should be that each facet
of every selected route should, to the greatest extent possible,
meet the minimum requirements of the department or agency
which would treat the question were it to arise outside the high-
way routing context. The decisions and standards of those depart-
ments or agencies would set the floor for consideration of these
matters by the highway administrators. The Memorandum pro-
vides an inroad for the application of this standard through its
emphasis on governmental coordination. The Policy and Proce-
dure Memorandum itself states that:
When a State highway department begins
considering the development or improvement
of a traffic corridor in a particular area, it
shall solicit the views of [those state, federal
and local agencies] which it believes might be
interested in or affected by the development
or the improvement. 65 [Emphasis added]
The views solicited from agencies should, if feasible, constitute
the minimum standard for each factor considered. Unfortunately,
the PPM imposes no such requirement.
B. Governmental Coordination -Local Benefits
The most manifest benefits of the required state solicitation of
views should accrue to local government. State and federal levels
of government have undeniable interests in the location and de-
sign of major thoroughfares. However, it is the metropolitan area
which is potentially most affected by highway construction. Road-
way construction within a city can condemn large amounts of
65 34 Fed. Reg. 727, supra note 15, at 729, §5.
[Vol. 3:2
Highway Routing
taxable property, thereby depleting the city's tax base and possi-
bly increasing the burden on remaining property-owner taxpayers.
It is the city which will lose parklands and playgrounds. 66 Local
school districts are the potential victims of concrete disruption of
their public school systems. Entire neighborhoods face destruc-
tion of their identity through relocation of a large percentage of
their population or loss of their shopping districts or churches
when a highway threatens to displace or impair access to these
elements of community.6 7
The presence of the local government unit in the routing pro-
cess is important for several reasons. First, it can present its own
position as a representative of the entire population, balancing
competing needs and aiding in a temperate solution to routing
problems. Second, the mantle of elected authority worn by the
local official lends strength to the positions assumed by that
official. The municipality can, by substituting authority for popu-
larity, effectively champion a viewpoint worthy of consideration
but held by only a small minority. This assures some modicum of
meaningful access to the decisional process for the interested
minority.
Finally, in augmenting those ideas worthy of support and mod-
erating those considered radical, the municipality will accumulate
information which may be passed on to the routing authorities.
This should relieve some of the burden on routing officials who
would otherwise be responsible for accumulating such in-
formation. At the same time, the individual has continuing access
to the public hearing as a safeguard against irresponsible local
government action. Yet the Memorandum leaves lingering doubts
about the effectiveness of the hearings as a means of access to the
routing process for interested persons.
86 For an extended discussion of the impact of highway construction on parklands see
Forer, Preservation of America's Park Lands: The Inadequacy of Present Law, 41
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1093 (1966). See also 23 U.S.C.A. § 138 (Supp. 1968) declaring that
the preservation of countryside beauty is a national policy. This section prohibits
Federal approval of a project requiring the use of public park or recreation lands
unless there is no feasible alternative to its use.
67 For example, see the facts of Ellington, note 45 supra.
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C. Access to Technical Data
In its attempt to involve the public in the routing process, the
Memorandum specifies that "maps, drawings, and other pertinent
information developed by the State highway department and writ-
ten views received as a result of the coordination outlined in
Paragraph 5.a will be made available for public inspection and
copying .... ."6s However, merely making these documents avail-
able for inspection and copying is not sufficient to guarantee that
less affluent, yet nonetheless vitally interested, persons will be
able to obtain these documents in preparation for the public
hearing. Some provision making these materials available at re-
production cost or free to a group of some specified minimum size
is necessary to include the poor among those who hope to partici-
pate in the routing process. 69
Yet even this may not provide effective access to the routing
process for an interested person or group unable to comprehend
the technicalities and ultimate ramifications of the material dis-
tributed. Those groups which lack sufficient expertise must re-
ceive aid in obtaining an explanation of the data provided to them.
Assistance along these lines could most easily come from within
the state highway department itself by allocating to one of its
members the responsibility of "public education" on route selec-
tion. The alternative would be to pay experts retained as con-
sultants by the interested parties when the parties themselves
68 34 Fed. Reg. 727, supra note 15, at 729, § 8(a)(3).
69 Information concerning studies of alternate routes should be made available to the
public prior to the public hearings. The Memorandum only requires that it be made
available at the public hearing. 34 Fed. Reg. 727, supra note 15, at 730, § 8(b)(3). In
the past, alternative route studies have been generally unavailable to the public. For
example, see Binghampton Citizens Penn-Van R. 17 H.C. v. Frederick, 180
N.Y.S.2d 913, 7 App.Div.2d 170 (3d Dept. 1958); compare, CAL. ST. & H'WAYS
CODE § 75.6 (196-5), and see Tippy, supra note 14, at 148 for a discussion of this
problem.
Some citizens have found that even the data which the highway department has
accumulated is inadequate to formulate any judgments about alternatives. They
discovered that they needed access to highway department computers in order to test
the relative effects of intermodal inputs of various alternatives in ways that the
highway department had not. Letter from Robert J. Sugarman, on file at PROSPECTUS
office, February 11, 1970.
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could not afford a consultant. 70 The former alternative would
seem preferable, although some provision must be added to cure
the credibility problems which could arise concerning the state-
ments of highway officials. 7' This information and assistance
should be made available upon the first notice of public hearing,
thirty to forty days before that hearing is to be held.72
Discussion of tentative right-of-way acquisitions and of con-
struction schedules at the hearings 73 will allow persons whose
homes and lands may be affected to plan intelligently for any
contingency. The discussion of relocation assistance con-
templated by the Memorandum 74 will arm affected persons with
all available information concerning government aid in finding
new home and business locations. This general approach should
cause any dissatisfaction with a chosen route or route proposal to
surface quite early in the procedure, thereby enabling com-
promise discussion to begin before plans have become too rigid.
One possible disadvantage is, of course, that the disenchantment
of persons or groups could earlier coalesce into organized opposi-
tion to a certain proposal and delay or prevent any solution, even
a compromise one, at the administrative level.
Further, to support its request for route or design approval, the
state highway departments must submit comparative studies of
70The federal government might provide substantial funds for this effort. The current
Memorandum indicates reimbursement for expenses associated with the public hear-
ing on the-same shared basis (90% Federal- 10% State) as other preliminary engineer-
ing costs. 34 Fed. Reg. 727, supra note 15, at 730, § 12.
71 Such a credibility problem arose in Ellington. See note 50 supra. Elimination of the
problem could most easily be accomplished by requiring that explanations to the
public be in writing upon request and by holding the highway department legally
bound by the answers which they formulate. This may force the highway department
to specially scrutinize the factor inquired about, but should really impose no burden
beyond the one theoretically borne at present-to examine all aspects relevant to a
routing or design determination.
72 The PPM already imposes such a requirement as to material currently made available to
the public. 34 Fed. Reg. 727, supra note 15, at 729, § 8(a)(3). For types of
information currently available to the public under the PPM, see note 69 supra and
accompanying text.73 This is currently required under the PPM. 34 Fed. Reg. 727, supra note 15, at 729, § 8
(a)(4).
74 Id., § 8(a)(5). Relocation assistance includes mandatory advisory aid from the state as
well as monetary payments for displaced individuals and businesses. 23 U.S.C.A.
§ § 501-511 (Supp. 1968).
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route or design alternatives to the federal division engineer who
grants initial federal approval of projects, thereby making them
eligible for federal funds. These studies point out the significant
differences between the alternatives and indicate the reasons why
one alternative is favored. 75 This is probably the most significant
coordinative provision in the Memorandum; in amassing the ac-
cumulated data, it is, in effect, the fruit of all other sections.
However, the Memorandum fails to take full advantage of the
information submitted to the division engineer by not requiring
that he support his decision with findings of fact gleaned from the
data submitted. Such a requirement would help ensure that no
aspect crucial to the decision has been overlooked. It would at
least discourage arbitrary decisions. Over an extended period of
time, this fact-finding process would elicit certain general stan-
dards applicable to all highway routing decisions.
VI. Effect of the Memorandum
It is difficult to predict the effect of the Policy and Procedure
Memorandum on the highway route judicial challenge. At the
very least, the Memorandum should tend to minimize the necessi-
ty of resort to the courts by providing access to the decisional
process at a time when comments on proposals are meaningful
and may provoke action. On the other hand, the PPM might also
eliminate many previous barriers to success when judicial relief is
sought.
Early inclusion of interested persons in the routing procedure
should result in those persons becoming aware of the effects of
any potential decision and should operate to diminish use of the
"laches" defense in routing challenges. It will put interested per-
sons "on notice" at a stage in the route selection process when
there has been comparatively little monetary expenditure favoring
one alternative over another. 76 In addition, it will encourage time-
75 34 Fed. Reg. 727, supra note 15, at 730, § 10 (b) (1)-(4).
76 See text accompanying notes 46-49 supra. However, earlier access to data supporting
various routes may cause a court to be less patient with those who wait until a
decision is "final" for any extended period. This may be especially true insofar as the




ly coalition of opposition to a routing or design proposal between
persons who find themselves in a common plight. Their sub-
sequent action may take the form of compromise discussion.
Should it result in legal action, however, that step will be taken at
a much earlier time than has been true in the past.
Moreover, the tactical decision as to when to initiate a judicial
challenge is simplified under the procedures outlined. While there
is, as yet, no formalized administrative appeal from the deter-
mination of the division engineer,7 7 splitting the route selection
process into the two distinct administrative decisions on location
and design provides a definite, appealable, final administrative
decision before the process is beyond the influence of interested
persons. 78 There can be no doubt that a route has been chosen
upon notice of the "highway design public hearing." 79 Promulga-
tion of formal administrative appeal procedures should further
simplify this tactical decision.80
Because the technical data concerning a route and its alterna-
tives will be available to prospective disputants,8 1 the burden of
suggesting a feasible alternative route during the course of judicial
challenge has been eased; the expensive accumulation of
plaintiff's supporting data will have been accomplished by the
routing authorities.
77 Though embodied in the originally proposed version (see note 15 supra), the promul-
gated Memorandum contains no formal procedure for appeal from the decision of the
division engineer who may grant initial federal approval to a state-requested route or
design. A proposal so providing has been withdrawn for further study in search of a
procedure which will "facilitate the ultimate disposition of highway issues without
unduly delaying the needed highway construction." 34 Fed. Reg. 727, supra note 15.
The original proposal contained an automatic stay of all action of the division
engineer while an appeal was under consideration. 33 Fed. Reg. 15663, 15666 (1968).
This provision could have significantly hindered progress if used indiscriminately.
The present PPM should encourage an orderly mode of appeal by informing in-
terested persons that an informal appeal procedure does exist, enabling proper direc-
tion of comments on, and objections to, decisions made. In a sense, this will formalize
the now concededly informal appeals procedure.78 See note 46 supra, and accompanying text. This partially avoids the "expended interest"
component of laches. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
There are three distinct decisions if the "highway-no highway" determination is
counted. However, until there is active public participation in that decision, citizens
are likely to be unaware that this decision has been made. See note 59 supra.
19 See text accompanying note 60 supra.80 See note 77 supra.
81 See note 72 supra, and accompanying text.
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While these barriers to judicial review and relief may be re-
moved by the implementation of the Policy and Procedure Mem-
orandum, a new barrier may have been created. if the courts
became increasingly willing to review the administratively deter-
mined route because they felt existing regulations and procedures
inadequate to protect the rights of involved persons, the imple-
mentation of competent, comprehensive procedures may cause
the courts to once again assert the deference to administrative
decisions characterized by earlier judicial opinions.82 However,
the PPM itself counters this by making available more com-
prehensive technical data from which administrative decisions
are made. This should provide courts with a certain degree of
expertise or at least more information which will make them more
at home in the process of review and could lead to greater, rather
than less, activism.
Another potential benefit of the new procedure is the devel-
opment of a more uniform system of highway routing within the
United States. Each state must conform substantially to the
outlines of the Memorandum in their routing procedures for
federal-aid highways. Rather than adhere to state procedures for
their own highways, the states may discover that the federal
framework best fits their needs for intrastate roadways. Wide-
spread use of these procedures should lead to the evolution of
standards which may guide the selective process on a national
basis.
VII. Conclusion
The Memorandum fails to take account of one factor which
may delay or even prevent full development of needed routing
standards through its coordinative provisions. The PPM does not
shift the responsibility for the route selection; it operates merely
as an input device which channels information into the hands of
the present decision-makers.
Highway department staff and officials have traditionally been
-82See notes 18-20 supra, and accompanying text. Jaffe, Public Actions, note 25 supra,
states at 1284, "The prime argument, thus, for the public action would be the absence
of these [administrative or political] controls."
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trained as engineers. As a result, they may be particularly unable
to grasp adequately the importance of much of the sociological or
environmental information likely to be introduced under the
Memorandum's procedures. Their training has been geared to the
inquiry process of a problem thought to be much narrower than is
now recognized. The same individuals who are eminently quali-
fied to handle an engineering problem may not be as well qualified
to comprehend and fully appreciate the ramifications of these
other problems. This is an additional reason to require that the
highway administrator should, to the greatest extent feasible,
view the opinions solicited from other departments or agencies as
the minimum standard for his treatment of the complicated fac-
tors involved in a highway routing decision. If this deficiency can
be overcome, either through direct involvement of other in-
terested groups in the decisional process or through a natural
process of education in continued highway department exposure
to these diverse elements, the Memorandum should develop fair
and efficient standards for route selection.
The Memorandum seeks to elicit general standards for the
routing process to remedy the present inadequacies of that sys-
tem. Widespread employment of the Memorandum's procedures
by both federal and state highway administrators, coupled with
increased coordination between various departments and levels
of government in the route selection process should facilitate the
development of such standards. Requiring the federal division
engineer to support his approval decision with findings of fact
would give added impetus to this development.
The standards would improve the quality of highway routing to
ensure that a decision is made which is beneficial to all people
affected by the new highway. Such standards would also provide
a framework within which the courts can operate intelligently in
cases of judicial challenge. Even if these standards are slow to
evolve, the Memorandum represents a forward step in the solu-
tion of highway routing problems.
May 19701
